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Levinasian Ethics and the Representation of the Other in International and Cross-
Cultural Management
1 look at you across the breakfast table, across the detritus of broken eggshells, a scattering of
breadcrumbs and empty coffee cups. 1look at yourface. A face 1have looked atfor all of the
thirty years we have been together. But then thatface is not the same one of five, ten, fifteen,
twenty years ago. What is behind that face? Do 1know? Have I ever known? 1 ask myself,
'Are we a couple?' Yes/No. Are ,ve a two or a one - a copula? Are we coupled? Are we (as
my dictionary suggests) 'Apair offorces of equal magnitude acting in parallel but opposite
directions, capable of causing rotation but not translation. ' It mostly seems not. You are not
me, 1am not you, you are Other: 1am Other. Have those years of face-to-face narrowed the
gap, closed the distance. Or are we still separated by an absolute difference. Is this distance
across the breakfast table an abyss, the one plotted out by Pirandello, a chasm charted by
Beckett? But 1care for you. I even say '1love you '. Because ... ? Because you define me, 1
define myself in you. My care for you is also a care of self. Do you care for me? Why?
1 look across your desk, across its fastidious neatness of compulsively composed piles offiles
and papers. 1look at your face. It is the face of a stranger. It is the face of a middle-aged
Chinese business man - or at least these are the words I conjure up most inadequately to
describe yourface. I cannot prevent the word 'inscrutable' from entering my mind. Why? I
don't know you. You are Other. I am projecting things onto your face from my reservoir of
thoughts, ideas and images that some might call 'knowledge '. Included are elements from the
repertoire that some label 'Theory'. But these are jumbled with other elements differently
labeled and unlabelable. I am asking you questions in a style that some might call 'interview'
and 1write down what you say. You tell me things that appear to be about howyou do
business.
1 look across my desk at my computer screen. On it is displayed a transcript of the interview I
had with the 'Chinese business man '. Hisface is no longer there - not even in my memory. I
just have 'his' words. What do they mean? 1look at the words on the screen. My reservoir of
thoughts, ideas and 'theories' direct my attention to certain words and certain phrases. I
extract these. Later I will order them in a particular manner. Then I will write a text of my
own because I am supposed to account for this 'Chinese business man '. I will presume to
represent him and his words in my text. What can I say about him? What do 1know about him
and his world - this stranger? Are we connected? Yes/No. I am uneasy and uncertain. How
wide and how deep is the abyss that separates me from this Other?
It's the first day of a new term. I fumble into the classroom, my arms loaded with papers,
handouts, notes and a list of names of students. I stare out into a sea of faces, all looking at
me. I smile, look down and start organizing my papers. Just another MBA class. Just
another semester. These are not white faces like mine. The students come from Thailand,
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China, India. Burma. Tibet. They come, I imagine, to get a 'western' education - an
education that Ifeel that I am somehow expected to represent. But who are these people?
My own culture is in my skin, in my breath, in my blood. I can visit other countries. talk to
people, read books. but looking at these faces should I try to teach management as it has been
canonized in the vanilla MBA? This is what they have been told to expect by the glossy
magazines that the University sends out. Should I talk about critique or ethics? Should I
practice critical management education? Both seem to just reinforce my self Whether it
originates with Kant or Foucault, with Taylor or Mayo, my knowledge is a knowledge from
the west. As I stare at these faces this knowledge seeps out of me into a meaningless puddle
on thefloor. l fire up the PowerPoint.
I go in search of knowledge, of authority. I go in search of textual reassurance to relieve my
anxiety. How do people, labeled 'international management scholars', account for these
Others they have subjected to their inquiry, to their knowledge and to their gaze? How do they
make their representations? I go to the sacred texts as if never having forgotten a desire for a
religion of the book. In Management and the Industrial Worldl I locate the following passage
in a discussion of management and industrialization in Israel:
The Arab and Sephardic elements are technically and culturally less well advanced, in
fact some authorities feel that the European and Asiatic groups are centuries apart
culturally ... For the analysis in this essay, this implies that the two former groups,
with some few exceptions, constitute the unskilled and semiskilled labor force and
currently, from a standpoint of potential management base, are ofless significance'
I find this unsettling. The chapter only mentions Arabic people on this one occasion, and
Palestinians are not mentioned at all. In talking about Egypt, they say that indigenous
management is 'primitive' with enterprises managed by a "strong willed individual or family
clique" where "one finds a personal rather than a functional type of organisation a complete
absence of rational management procedures, and a dearth of competent professional and
supervisory personnel." 3 They continue, asserting that Egypt's greatest current asset are those
people who have graduated or received training or experience overseas - since this makes
them "sophisticated"! Elsewhere, there is reference to British' aristocratic values', German
'authoritarianism', the 'unquestioning loyalty' of the Japanese subordinate, the 'patrimonial'
Indian businessman (also intimated as being 'thrusting and unscrupulousr', I could go on.
This is not an obscure book - it is a foundational text for international and cross cultural
management studies (lCMS). Harbison and Myers were there (along with Clark Kerr and
others") at the start when ICMS emerged as an academic discourse, primarily in the United
States just after WWII. As US international trade burgeoned, there was a perceived need to
confront Soviet global incursions through the bulwark of US international investment and
business practice. As US trade transactions grew, there was also the need to have
representations of other cultures' business and management practices so that the world could
be managed. This was a knowledge that embraced the injunctions of normal science, realist
ontology, neo-positivist epistemology and the methodological colours of structural
functionalism as exemplified by Parsons in sociology and Radcliffe-Brown in anthropology.
What I also found in this early discourse of ICMS is a particular universalistic motif that
deploys the rhetoric of modernization, development and industrialization that tied US
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business interests to those projects and to US foreign policy ambitions. This comes replete
with the belief that to modernize and develop, other countries need to go through a process
that mapped the industrialization process the West had already successfully negotiated. It used
a language that represented the Other in relation to the pre-modern, undeveloped and
underdeveloped world and the need for the West to intervene to bring development and
modernity to it. It is a continuation of an exploitative imperial project in that it involves a
colonization of indigenous people through a 'truth' that sustains the colonizing culture 7 - the
culture that sustains both my life and my anxieties.
Like a bastard social Darwinism ICMS demanded nothing less that progress - a progress built
behind a veneer of positivistic theories and methods deployed to scrutinize and represent the
management and organization practices of the non-West. It was an appropriation strategy that
constructed representations of the Other refracted through a Western theoretic-ideological
lens and devoid of any input from the Other and their own understandings interests and
knowledge systems. With the rise to dominance of contingency theory in organisation studies
with their 'culture-free' hypothesis (arguing that organizational contingencies determine
structural form regardless of cultural contextj'' weaponry kept being added to the armoury.
Fearing that I was being misled by these dusty and sacred texts from the dawn of the
discipline, I went in search of something more contemporary. After all, most of this was
written in the 1950s and, still enamoured (often unknowingly) by a culture erected on a
concept of temporal progress, I hoped for more. I looked into Redding's The Spirit of Chinese
Capitalism' and found and intriguing account of contemporary business and management
among the overseas Chineselo based upon a carefully constructed edifice of Confucian
heritage. Not only are a divergent and dispersed set of people collected up and homogenized,
but their contemporaneousness is denied by anchoring all they do to the glories of China's
past. The essentialisms flow like the Yellow River after a monsoon: "compliance and
conservatism are widespread characteristics to a degree where they might be taken as central
parts of the ideal-type Chinese personality't'"; Chinese workers are notable for their
'''trainability'. They have traditions of diligence and disciplined education, and also a high
level of manual dexterityv"; "Chinese people 'see the world' differently to others's':', "cause
for the Chinese is a matter of 'connectedness', of understanding the mutual, reciprocal
interplays between a large array of forces"!", and so on.
Despite my concerns, I know too that Redding's is a sympathetic attempt to portray another
culture's business systems emically. But still, the core theme of the book is that the
contemporary East only being sensical either with reference to the legacies of a faded
civilization, or by reference to the modernity and progression of the West. This is a text
written by a Westerner for a Western audience yet one that presumes to have gazed upon,
apprehended and then accurately represented the Other. But I don't want to single out
Redding - such practices were apparent in almost every ICMS text that I looked at. The one
that really grabbed me, even astonished me, was Comparative Management: A Transcultural
Odyssey", Replete with its Homeric eponym, the book divides the world's cultures into four
'paradigm views of the world' and makes a central contrast between Western 'atomism' and
Eastern 'holism'. This is oddly linked to theories of the dual hemisphericity of the brain:
"These two orientations [atomism and holism] have been attributed to the relative dominance
of the two brain hemispheres, the analysing reductive left brain, which seems to dominate the
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Western world and the synthesising, visio-spatial right brain which seems to dominate in the
East.,,16 My hopes of progress began to wane.
If I did come to a point of knowing something, it was that IC\1S, like all research practices, is
involved in the problematics and politics of representation. But there seemed a particular
acuity to such problematics and politics in ICMS given its express encounter with difference
and the presence of extant differential power structures and relationships that inevitably
frames any research. ICMS offered itself to me as a practice of appropriation and
representation where Western17 scholars (my own image keeps creeping back despite my
protestations) subject other countries' /cultures' management and organisational practices to
the machinery of northern science so they can construct representations that can stand as
'knowledge' enabling them to better engage with, manage and control them. In the same
movement, the West's management systems and managers are conjured up and valorized, as
ifby magic, in relation to the represented others. This is a white man's knowledge spoken
with authority and universalism. It requires no conspiracy theory to see that this authority is a
handmaiden to Western dominance in international business.
It should be clear by now that the answers and solutions I was looking for were not to be
found in ICMS. Even worse, ICMS just made my problems worse. What I did find, though,
was that my problems resonated with the philosophical investigations of postcolonial theory. I
turned to them for guidance. To start with I considered the detailed examination of the
representation of the colonial Other by the West in Said's discussion of Orientalism .18 For
Said:
[O]rientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and
epistemological distinction made between 'the Orient' and (most of the time)
'the Occident.' Thus a very large mass of writers, among who are poet,
novelists, philosophers, political theorists, economists, and imperial
administrators, have accepted the basic distinction between East and West as the
starting point for elaborate accounts concerning the Orient, its people, customs,
'mind,' destiny, and so on .... the phenomenon of Oriental ism as I study it here
deals principally, not with a correspondence between Orientalism and Orient,
but with the internal consistency of Orientalism and its ideas about the Orient. 19
Said suggests that Orientalism constructs an Other in relation to the primacy of a western Self.
It appropriates and represents the oriental Other through a complex and networked set of
practices that are less about a real attempt to see, understand and explain that Other and more
about providing a representation meaningful to the West. Through Orientalism the Other is
understood first and foremost in the language of the Same (i.e. the occident), it is an
assimilation the Other to the Self. Said meticulously unravels the multitude of representations
and representational practices and reveals their interdependence with the institutions and
practices of colonialism. This was a 'knowledge' of the orient that came to be regarded as
"fundamentally stable,,2o . But the oriental never spoke for him or herself.
Comparing what I read in ICMS to Said, I provisionally concluded that Orientalism and
northern science were twins enabling and legitimating discourses that continue to serve the
neo-colonial project of which ICMS is a component. These representations aren't accurate or
real, maybe they were never intended or required to be; like Said says, Orientalism is "entirely
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distinct and unattached to the east as understood within and by the east,,21.No genuine desire
to know the Other can be found. I wasn't the first to realise these connections either - they
have recently been documented in certain comers of organization and management theory.22
In management, just like Orientalism, the Other's subjectivity is constructed by a Western
discourse that claims to speak authoritatively and definitively about it. It is a practice of
(mis)representation that seeks to make the Other knowable and hence manageable. Along the
way, the Other is silenced through not being asked to self-represent. Silenced through being
homogenised. Silenced through having their own knowledge systems derided, obliterated,
ignored or marginalised. Silenced through the West's control and policing of the discourse and
the machineries of knowledge production and dissemination.
Said was pessimistic. He thought Westerners were ontologically incapable of a 'true' or even
sympathetic representation of the Other. This made me shudder.
So what is my relationship to my Chinese businessman and how can I relate to his Otherness?
How do I deal with a multi-cultural classroom when my knowledge and culture are rooted in
the West? What might my (subject) position be? Who is my Western Self that is in relation to
this oriental Other? What are my responsibilities? Should I presume to speak about/of/for this
Other, or remain silent? If I speak, by what right do I do so? My questions are all still
unanswered as I only reinforce the belief that all our confrontations with difference are
fraught with danger.
ICMS, like colonial discourse, seems to want to construct a monolithic Other, one in some
state of lack so that Western management and business has a reason and a capacity to
penetrate. Like colonialist and Orientalist practices it assimilates the Other to the Same by
appropriating strategies that construct the Other as a knowable and known alterity. This is a
projection entirely in terms of the West's own knowledge systems and self identity - a
projection that in fact reflects a deficit, and uncertainty, within self. My pinning of you in a
stereotype, like a moth pinned in categorical displays at the Natural History Museum, is my
attempt to settle myself, to bring me ease, to order my world.
While Said focuses almost entirely on the discourse(s) of the colonizer, reading Bhabha23 took
me in a different direction. What he wants to see is the complex and negotiated interplay
between the colonized and the colonizer. He does not accept that colonial discourse is
monolithic or that the colonized is a mere captive of that discourse. This comes across as
more respectful - I like it. The West, he argues, has an ever-present ambivalence towards the
oriental Other, an ambivalence informed in part by its own psychic uncertainties and
ambiguities. So, the Orient is, for example, at once both completely knowable through the
'scientific' gaze of the colonizer (like Said says), but at the same time it is an object of desire,
and a danger and threat that is mysterious and unknowable. The relationship is essentially
unstable, mobile and conflictual, it is structured "by forms of multiple and contradictory
belief,24 The Other cannot be apprehended as having a set of fixed, pre-given characteristics
that inscribe a definite cultural identity. Nor can the colonizer be seen as coming to the Other
with a fixed and homogenous set of ideas and categories with which to affix to the Other in a
monological imposition.
What Bhabba says is that cultural identities are negotiated, cultural differences and their
representations are 'performed' in a liminal space, a space of hybridity since neither Self nor
6
Other sustains an independent and untrammeled identity at the interface. Bhabha sees the
homogenisation and monolithic tendencies of colonial and orientalist discourse as akin to
fetishism - an attempt to construct a fixed, arrested and stable imaginary Other to satisfy the
desires of Self. It is a fetishism constituted by the oscillation, the 'play' between the desire for
the affirmation of the Same or sameness and the anxiety associated with difference and a
sense of lack in self in the face of that difference, that Otherness. However, the repetitions and
differance of the discourse mean that meanings slip and disperse and the would-be monolithic
discourse looses coherence, splits and fractures to reveal the uncertainties, ambiguities and
fetishes of the colonizer. Colonial discourse is always "less than one and double,,25 The
discourse is unstable because of the 'translation' as the West's ideas and theories get ensnared
in the dynamics of interface, of the space between Self and Other and become hybridized.
For Bhabba even if the Other is seduced into a self-identification with the identity offered by
the colonizer this mimicry turns back to the colonizer as a deformation, as a challenge to the
coherence and fixity the colonizer aspires to. The mimics not-quite-sameness destabilises the
regime of the stereotype and the coherence of the identity of the Self seeking definition in a
fixed and knowable Other. Braithwaite had noted a similar ambivalence in his notion of
'creolisation', wherein forces of both imitation and assimilation occupy the same space as
subversive and resistant forces of indiginisation.i''
So, in terms of my own problems as a Western ICMS researcher and teacher, this tells me that
I can't assume that there is a stable identity in the Other that I should find, know and then
write. It also tells me that my own identity is at stake. The Other that I confront - whether in
research, in the classroom or socially - is already soaked in the (neo )colonial experience, in
the serried representations proffered by the (my) West, and in his/her reactions and
hybridizations of those strategies. More complexly, any sense of the Other available to me can
only emerge in the performance of the interaction, in the interstices of a cultural encounter,
the constitution of which cannot be determined a priori.
I can't see any way back from these recognitions to the old assurances of univeralisations or
even limpid humanistic pluralisations. But then I might suggest that I am a hybrid too, a
mongrel diasporized 'Englishman', a constructed identity at the interstices of all manner of
historical and cultural confluences and confusions. Is not the ethos of the United States based
upon hybridity and does not the field ofICMS actual celebrate hybridity as a feature of
globalization - as a force for the dissolution of those tricky cross-cultural differences in
international business encounters? The construction of the mimic man was, after all, a
colonial device of control. If we are all hybrids, all mongrels, where is the cultural difference
that differentiates and where is the divide that we have to negotiate - except simply the chasm
between two subject positions?
If I am moved to reject any essentialist view of identity and reject the epistemic violence by
which colonial and Orientalist discourse has constructed universalist categories, stereotypes
and codings of the Other, am I left with the pursuit of complete heterogeneity and in a sense
with complete particularism? Can I, then, only speak about this particular Chinese
businessman, perhaps needing to drop the category 'Chinese' (and perhaps 'business' - for
assuredly that is not all he is; and perhaps 'man' because he is not defined entirely by
gender!). Language is getting in my way, but it's all I have.
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I read some of Spivak's texts and found her using the term of the toute autre to ward of
assimilation strategies and to sustain heterogeneity. The Other remains unassailably distanced,
an absolute alterity that cannot be subsumed or assimilated by sameness: the abyss remains.
This is akin to Bhabha's sometime references to the notions of the completely Other, the
'untranslatable' element of identity.r ' and to the incommensurability of cultural differences.
The idea of the absolute Other serves to resist assimilation, resist naming the Other in the
codes and categories of the West or assimilating to the sameness of Self. No more the Other
in the image of a ventriloquist's dummy. Spivak at times seems to advise that the absolute
Other, the subaltern, be considered as an 'inaccessible blankness' that reveals the limits of the
West's knowledge and representational systems. However, invoking Derrida, Spivak gestures
towards an alternative: "Derrida does not invoke 'letting the other(s) speak for himself but
rather invokes an 'appeal' to or 'call' to the' quite-other' (toute autre as opposed to a self-
consolidating other), of 'rendering delirious that interior voice that is the voice of the other in
us ",28
But, where does all that leave me? What can I say about any Other I encounter - am I
silenced, choking on the inadequacy of my own language, unable to represent at all? Clearly,
and pragmatically I am not. The Other will be spoken, whether that results in appropriation,
misrepresentation or other violations - I'm doing it now; I can't not not do it. Even equipped
with the most radical reflexivity the Other still gets textually rendered - as does the self. But
still, I ask, can I make a representation of the Other responsibly, given that if I speak I cannot
evade or step outside the subject-position that is spoken through me - a particular historical,
cultural, ideological location. I cannot step outside the interestedness of my need to so
represent, I cannot assume an innocence.
In the 'Politics of Translation', Spivak seems to acknowledge my concerns with the toute
autre and says that "it is not possible for us as ethical agents to imagine otherness or alterity
maximally. We have to tum the Other into something like the selfin order to be ethical.,,29
This invokes two threads of ideas. the first resonates with Derrida's notion of the inner voice
of the Other in us, and the second with Spivak's notion of strategic essentialism. Derrida
suggests the Self-in-the-Other and echoes Bhabha's insistence (via Lacan) that a sense of self,
of identity constitution, is dependent on the Other. In Remembering Fanon, Bhabha says that
"to exist is to be called into being in relation to an Otherness ,,30, reintroducing the idea of the
Other (and the Self) as a relational construct. The Self only exists and is only meaningful in
relation to some Other and the notion of a totally independent Self is as untenable as an
absolute Other.
The notion of complete heterogeneity that Spivak at times seems to promote is acknowledged
to be an idealisation that is in practice negotiable and thus the construction of collective
identities, of strategic essentialism, is a necessity on the way to full decolonisation. She
permits this as long as we remain conscious of its expedient status, and do not allow it to slip
into an essentialism that we take as a real representation. Thus I may make collective
representations of the Other as long as the status as a pragmatic fiction is clear and as long as
it contributes to a liberatory and not a repressive practice and outcome.
I seem to be arriving at a clearing. I find that I am not condemned to silence with respect to
the Other, nor entirely to a scary solipsism. I can speak, but I need to do so brutally aware of
my own commitments, motives and subject positions, brutally aware of my responsibilities,
and brutally aware of the brutality oflanguage.
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I am left still groping toward that ethic and feel that Spivak and Bhabha have not provided
either a resolution or a way to go on. Given the intellectual connections and lineage between
Spivak and Bhabba, via Derrida, is back towards Emmanuel Levinas, it is hoped that some
more inspiration might be found there. Upon reading Levinas I was quite enamoured when I
found that he not only dealt specifically with an ethics of the Self-Other relationship, but he
also directly addressed this in terms of work.
There is an abyss between labour, which results in works having a meaning
for other men, and which others can acquire - already merchandise reflected
in money - and language, in which I attend my manifestation, irreplaceable
and vigilant. But this abyss gapes open because of the en-ergy of the
vigilant presence which does not quit the expression. It is not to expression
what the will is to its work; the will withdraws from its work, delivering it
over to its fate, and is found to have "willed" a lot of things" it had not
willed. For the absurdity of these works is not due to a defect in the thought
that formed them; it is due to the anonymity into which this thought
immediately falls, to the unrecognition of the worker that results from this
essential anonymity [... ] In political life, taken unrebuked, humanity is
understood from its works - a humanity of interchangeable men, of
reciprocal relation. The substitution of men for one another, the primal
disrespect, makes possible exploitation itself. 31
This humanity of interchangeable men speaks so directly to my experience with ICMS - in
fact we could even say that ICMS makes this interchangeability even more exacerbated than it
might otherwise be. Whether it be in relation to work or culture, the worker is already
positioned both as "merchandise reflected in money" as well as having his or her particularity
rendered into anonymity. Spivak's toute autre is still nowhere to be found - only a gesture
towards a toute meme. As Levinas argues there is a gaping abyss between work, as production
for the consumption of others, and the expression of an irreplaceable self. Indeed, for Levinas
work is a matter of "actions, gestures, manners, objects utilized and fabricated,,32 work is a
relationship of exteriority in the sense that workers are always interchangeable so as to render
them subjects of the "anonymous field of economic life,,33which "reduces to the same what at
first presented itself as other,,34. It is here that the "will" withdraws from the person as s/he
is regarded only in terms of his or her belonging to categories which anonymise their
particularity. When Levinas writes of 'political life' , understood as rules and institutions for
the governance of people, humanity is little more than the interchangeability of people. Such
work is a betrayal of the self - a masking and dissimulation of the self's. It involves a "primal
disrespect" that enables exploitation.
At this point, my problems still seem to be getting worse. Is there no hope for a solution to
the ethical problems of representing the Other in organization studies or in ICMS? Levinas
does, however, provide a proviso for this state of affairs; a proviso that might help me out. In
the citation included above, Levinas is specific in claiming that the political renders people
anonymous only if it goes unrebuked. It is within this fissure in the politics of work where
such a rebuke, such a critique, is rendered possible. But what I'm starting to realise is the real
problem lies in the way that my problem is articulated as being one of a search for knowledge.
Levinas' attestation to a rebuke is not based on the desire for knowledge of an object (e.g. the
objectified worker) but a form of knowing that is "able to put itself in question". My starting
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question needs to be questioned, not answered. Answering would mean "elaborating a
psychology" which involves "the determination of the other by the same". Questioning
would mean "the act of unsettling its own condition". This is an attestation to the Other that
"eludes thematization" while being shameful of "the consciousness of [its] own injustice" in
refuting the identity of the Other by representing it36.
For Levinas, ethics requires the Other to be considered as being radically different from the
same - it needs to account for the absolute particularity, strangeness and unknowability of the
Other. As Levinas describes it this is an Other that is irreducible to the I, irreducible to me -
the Other that is radically separated from oneself and one's knowledge rather than being a
subject of it. Levinas makes the very telling point that if comprehension, intelligence and
knowledge are a "way of approaching the known being such that its alterity with regard to the
knowing being vanishes't". I take this to mean that a recognition of the Other places it outside
such knowledge systems and into the realm of ethics. So, must I address the Other from a
point that might be located outside of knowledge itself?
I started with a problem of how to know the Other without falling into the Orientalist trap of
appropriating that Other. Now my problem seems less to be about the specific knowledge of
ICMS, but more about knowledge itself, about the presumption of the knowability of the
Other and the presumption of a righteousness of the quest for such a knowledge. What
Levinas adds to this is that rather than being premised on a pre-occupation with knowledge,
subjectivity starts with ethics in the sense that it is only when the self is brought into
proximity with the Other that it emerges as a self. The self becomes a 'hostage' of the Other
not a knower of it- the very Other in relation to which the self exists. It is this relationality
that suggests that a self is always one from which a response to the Other is demanded and to
which the self is responsible. This is not a relationship whereby the Other is subsumed into or
known by the self. but rather one of 'infinite responsibility' to the Other - an Other who can
never be fully known in the intensity of its own particularity and to whom one is responsible
without the expectation of reciprocity. As Davis puts it when commenting on Levinas, "the
Other lies absolutely beyond my comprehension and should be preserved in all its irreducible
strangeness't." This resonates again with Spivak's toute autre.
But dealing with the toute autre is not about knowing nothing, but about being prepared to
rebuke knowledge of the Other in the name of ethics. This ethics is not something that can be
applied to solve my ethical crisis of representation. More radically, the relationship between
self and Other is ethics and that this is a relationship of exteriority - it entails being open to
"the existence of the separated being,,39. The point here is that for me to recognize my
responsibility to the Other means me not regarding that Other as merely another version of my
self or my knowledge - the relationship between the Other is not totalizable, but remains
endlessly open. Responsibility, or ethics, is not something that is achieved by a particular
way of dealing with others but is rather a condition of the self that can never be achieved.
The anxiety that provoked my question must remain unresolved if this ethics is to remain
alive - it is my desire for a sleep of the just that keeps me tossing and turning at night. If I
thought I had solved my initial problems of wanting to know the Other, then those problems
would have been multiplied. My question does not provoke a knowledge based solution, it
provokes affect and sensibility: "Knowledge would be the suppression of the other by the
grasp, or by the hold, or by the vision that grasps before the grasp'<'",
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Okay, so for Levinas' ethics is based on the radical exteriority, yet particularity, of the Other
and further that the ethical particularity of the Other can only be damaged by knowledge and
categorization. "When the Other dissolves into the Many, the first thing to dissolve is the
Face ,41,says Zygmunt Bauman, another of Levinas' readers. The desire for such dissolution
appears as an attempt to secure power through an agnosticism towards ethics and a seduction
by knowledge. With knowledge, the Other becomes a stranger and the strangeness of the
oriental Other is one where people are seen as not having personal identities but rather as
being assigned to particular classes and categories that in no way originate from them. We do
not know them, but rather know of them in our own terms - they are types, not persons as
such. They have no faces. As many a culture shocked tourist has said - "they all look the
same".
Following Bauman's reading of Levinas, it is apparent that ethics is not about righteously
declaring oneself or others as being righteous, nor is it about sanctimoniously damning others
as being immoral. Instead, ethics is an ongoing process of 'becoming-ethical' that can never
be completed. Ethics appears now like a form of anxiety involving an ongoing questioning
and interrogation of one's conduct, a questioning in part that I am trying to do here. To claim
to be 'ethical" renders ethics as the subject of knowledge - it would mean putting a stop to the
deliberations that are the stuff of ethics. In Bauman's terms the 'moral impulse' can never be
satisfied. Knowledge might offer me a promise of freedom from moral anxiety when in fact it
is that very anxiety that is the substance of my morality. It is here that the "moral self is
always haunted by the suspicion that it is not moral enough?". What this suggests is not that
ICMS is a necessarily morally void discourse, but rather that it needs to open itself up to the
anxiety of which Bauman speaks. This is an anxiety that emanates from an always
incomplete ethics where "the responsibility to respond to the other is an infinite responsibility,
one that increases the more it is fulfilled,,43. Spivak's toute autre remains an idealization that
provokes the anxiety required for ethics.
Naivete is always inviting - an invitation to take up easy positions that assuage guilt and
uncertainty, positions that remove anxiety. I am not immune. I am a doer of knowledge. I do
represent the Other both as a professional researcher and as an every day user of language.
These representations are knowledge, the very knowledge that tries to cast ethical
unknowability of the Other asunder. So given the antipathy of knowledge and ethics, yet the
impossibility of not doing knowledge, the new question that starts to bug me is 'how might
ICMS take responsibility for its representations of the other?' Let's not be glib - this 'taking
responsibility' is no simple matter yet one that we face everyday as we choose how we
represent other people by writing and talking. In Derrida's terms this puts the 'representor'
squarely in a position of undecidability. Derrida describes this undecidability as follows:
The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two decisions; it
is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the
calculable and the rule, is still obliged - it is obligation that we must speak - to give
itself up to the impossible decision, while taking account of law and rules. A decision
that didn't go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision; it
would only be the programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process ....
the ordeal of the undecidability that I just said must be gone through by any decision
worthy of the name is never past or passed, it is not a surmounted or sublated
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(au[gehoben) moment in decision. The undecidable remains caught, lodged, at least as
a ghost - but an essential ghost - in every decision, in every event of decision. Its
ghostliness deconstructs from within any assurance of presence, any certitude or any
supposed criteriology that would assure us of the justice of a decision, in truth of the
f d .. 44very event 0 a ecisron,
The ethical issue for ICMS that I take this to imply is one of taking up responsibility for the
representation of those that have hitherto been subsumed as oriental others and accepting that
such representations be regarded as a matter of decision rather than of neutral. objective or
mimetic representation. Such a point is clearly relevant to any practice of representing the
Other, but it is particularly salient to ICMS on account of the colonial legacy of exploitation
on which so much of its representational practices depend. In a sense this calls for a post-
colonial ICMS that takes its colonial legacy as being central both to the problem of
representation and to the decisions that might be made in the present when choosing to (or
choosing not to) study people from other cultures and in making particular representations of
them. Such decisions, as Derrida points out, are always particular, always requiring some
ordeal of undecidability: "[ e]ach case is other, each decision is different and requires an
absolutely unique interpretation, which no existing, coded rule can or ought to guarantee
absolutely 45". In a Levinasian sense "not knowing how to respond in the face of the call from
the Other [ ... ] involves undecidability, a clear and certain recognition that one is drawn in
[at least] two irreducible directions but still must decide in order to act,,46. Moreover, as
Derrida proposes, deciding in the face of the undecidable is a form of madness, rather than
one of knowledge or rationality. It is an immersion in this madness that might bend towards
the impossible demands of an ethics of the toute autre.
From Levinas to Derrida, a new ethics of ICMS seems imaginable (but not easy). This
imaginability emerges when the representation of the Other in ICMS is regarded as a site of
undecidability, even though the reality ofICMS has been born from a desire to remove the
undecidability of the Other by rendering it knowable in an absolute and universalistic fashion.
The radicalness of this aporia weighs heavy, especially given that "management thought has
returned again and again to the suggestion that there might be a solid ground ... that would
remove uncertainty"; and further that "the disappearance or management of political and
ethical quandaries in the face of some great calculating machine would indicate not ethics but
rather then end of ethics,,47. The problem then is that the desire for certainty in knowing the
Other (as many) has been at the very centre ofICMS - this is a project whose intention was to
render the cultural Other knowable such that s/he can be managed. An ethicalization of ICMS
would entail, at very least, abandoning this quest as being both futile and wrong - saying no
to an end of ethics.
My questions have all been quite practical. They have all been about how to go on with
research and writing in relation to the ethical problematics of representing the Other in ICMS.
Personally this is a political as well as an ethical problem. In discussing Levinas' ethics in
relation to the multitude of Other people, Hansel has noted the political imperative that "[the]
institution ... can in turn pervert itself, forgetting its justification and oppressing human
beings in an impersonal totality. We must remain vigilant to prevent human rights - or, more
precisely, the rights of the other man [sic] in his uniqueness - from being flouted by the
abstraction of the system,,48. Ifwe regard ICMS as having been a handmaiden to the modern
institution of the western corporation, then the political implications of Hansel's comments to
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ICMS are both palpable and significant. In one sense this is relevant to all confrontations of
and representations of the Other in organisations as such. However it is the colonial and
Orientalist legacy of ICMS that makes it particularly salient to, and exaggerated in, that
discourse. At very least, this involves Levinas' awareness that 'we' or 'them' can never be
the plural of 'I' or 'you'.
Diprose has made the provocation that "[d]ecolonization, the opening of modes of living
beyond the imperialism sustained by the truth of colonization, rests on the ability of the
colonizers to respond to [the] contestation of their 'truth' generously, in Levinas' sense. This
is a generosity born of an affective corporeal response to alterity that generates rather than
closes off cultural difference'<". To try and get at such an affectivity, I turned to Levinas
distinction between the said and the saying in Otherwise than Being. If I've come to a
provisional conclusion from all these deliberations, it is about how the knowledge of the said
might be replaced by the affect of the saying as a means of cultivating a necessary
undecidability for an ethical ICMS.
For Levinas, the said is that which is signified - it is the ontological function of language that
seeks to represent and objectify. The said is that which would:
idealize the identity of entities ... [it] ... would constitute that identity, and recuperate
the irreversible, coagulate the flow of time into a 'something', thematize, ascribe a
meaning. It would take up a position with regard to this "something", fixed in a
present, re-present it to itself, and thus extract it from the labile character of time. 50
In these terms, ICMS, in its representation of the Oriental Other, is a particular and extreme
instance of the objectification that is enabled by the said - one that fails to acknowledge its
limits or the potency of that failure. Saying, on the other hand, is that "which signifies prior to
essence, prior to identification,,51. The saying precedes the said, such that the said can never
be reduced to saying. Levinas' comments point to the very limits of language as a means of
signifying the ethical relation with the Other. It is in the saying that language is not reduced to
an objective knowledge but involves that activity of knowing the Other. Saying is a matter of
responding to the Other - one that "weaves an intrigue of responsibility'Y. Saying is
sincerity, an openness to the Other rather than closing the Other off in the said. Saying is not
"the communication of a said, which would immediately cover over and extinguish or absorb
the said, but saying holding open its openness, without excuses, evasions or alibis, delivering
itself without saying anything said,,53. The saying is the ethics of language that constitutes the
condition of the possibility of the said, yet an exclusive focus on the said overlooks the
"essential exposure to the Other"; the quandary that results is that "Saying is never fully
present in the Said, yet the Said also constitutes the only access we have to it; it leaves a trace
on the Said but is never revealed in it,,54.
Levinas' distinction between the saying and the said does not 'solve' any (of my)
epistemological problems - more importantly it suggests a reconsideration of those problems
- a reconsideration that I have been trying to work through here. The saying points me
towards an ethics that requires a certain humility in relation to the knowledge structures that I
might be seduced by - structures that are inevitably in the realm of the said.
ICMS, has been a project aimed at knowing the cultural Other such that s/he can be managed.
It is also a project that has failed to be open to the otherness of the Other - instead always
having sought to render it in relation to the same or the self. As a form of knowledge it fails
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to take responsibility for the undecidabilities (and un-knowabilities) of its own epistemic
practice. I hope that attesting to focus on the saying is not merely a point of academic
intrigue, but rather a call that the knowledge systems used to categorise others as workers in
general, and as foreign others in particular, is one that at best privileges knowledge over ethics
and at worst destroys ethics with knowledge.
I choose not to end with a solution, but with a requirement for a management practice and a
management theory that has an openness that might take it beyond its sad colonial legacy -
one that can still go on without claiming to have said it all, one that might place ethics ahead
of knowledge.
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